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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is a declaratory judgment case which was bifurcated from the damages/accounting 
action filed by Bret Kunz (and later Marti Kunz), insurance agents operating the Montpelier office 
of an insurance agency business. The action was instituted against Nield, Inc. (Pocatello office) d/b/a 
Insurance Designers under a contract between the two offices. Bret and his wife took over the 
Montpelier Office after Bret's brother, Michael 0. Kunz, suddenly died in July 2008. 
Michael Kunz had a contract relationship with Nield, Inc., under which both Michael and 
Nield, Inc. were 50/50 co-owners of the Montpelier "Book of Business" (i.e. the right to 
commissions from residuals and other premiums paid on existing policies). Bret bought out Mike's 
widow, Judy Kunz', 50 percent and took over operations of the Montpelier office, having his wife, 
Marti Kunz, obtain her insurance licence for the life and health business (which was wholly owned 
by Michael Kunz). Bret continued the property and casualty insurance as he had been an agent in the 
Montpelier office for many years. Nield, Inc. suggested Bret buy Mike's book of business. 
Bret then requested that Nield, Inc. (then managed by Bryan Nield) prepare a contract for 
Bret and Marti to be identical with what Michael had previously with Nield, Inc. Bryan Nield 
prepared a draft which was approved by both Bret and Marti. Subsequently they had a formal, in 
person, signing around the end of October or early November 2008. However, the document actually 
signed contained language different than the draft, and different than the Michael Kunz contract. 
That contract is the subject of the underlying action and this appeal. 
From 2009 through 2013, when this case was filed, Bret Kunz received profit sharing, 
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sometimes called contingent commission, payments originating from the sales of insurance through 
State Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Gem Acuity Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Acuity"), 
Farmer's Alliance Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Alliance"). He claimed entitlement to his pro-rata 
share of Profit Sharing payments received by Nield, Inc., for those same years. 
The original issues set for the first stage of the bifurcated trial were the right to receive the 
profit sharing payments, the proper commission split bet'.veen Nield, Inc. and Bret Kunz on profit 
sharing payments, and whether or not Nield, Inc. had any right to commissions of the life and health 
policies sold by Plaintiffs. After a two-day trial on the declaratory judgment issues, the Court ruled 
that Plaintiff Bret Kunz had no right to profit sharing or contingent commissions payments relative 
to Acuity, Alliance or Allied, but did have a right to 50% of the profit sharing payments on Gem 
State. Since Defendant stipulated on the eve of trial that it had no interest in the Kunz's life and 
health business, and the Court certified the Declaratory Judgment issues as final for appeal, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. Rule 54, and this appeal ensued. This is the strange situation where the Plaintiffs 
prevailed at trial, and the fact finder found their witnesses credible, found the Defendant's witnesses 
not credible, found the facts in favor of the Plaintiff, but ruled for the Defendant anyway. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff Bret Kunz filed a complaint on November 13, 2013, seeking an accounting of all 
profit sharing, bonuses, surplus commissions, or other incentives paid to Nield, Inc. from 2008 
through 2012, (Count One), and Declaratory Relief that (l) the agent contract in question includes 
all bonuses, commissions, incentives, and profit sharing or other remuneration received by Nield, 
Inc. that are influenced by Plaintiff' sales of insurance policies; (2) that the Plaintiff appropriate 
share of said bonus or profit sharing is 80%; and (3) that Nield, Inc. had no interest in the health and 
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life insurance sold by Plaintiff. (Count Two). R. 
Defendant answered and counterclaimed, seeking damages for breach of contract for not 
all insurance through Nield, and simultaneously filed a "Cross-Claim Complaint" 
against Marti Kunz for breach of contract, as well. 1 R. 42-52 
Plaintiff sought to subpoena the records of three of the insurance companies ( other than Gem 
State) for 2009-2012 which Defendant opposed by Motion for Protective Order. R. 58-74. 
Defendant also filed a Motion for Change of Venue. R. 77-79. The Court denied both the 
Motion for Protective Order and the Motion to Change Venue. R. 181-205. 
Defendant also filed a Motion to Bifurcate the proceedings, R. 142-43, and the issue was 
briefed by both parties. R. 144-50, 155-602, 171-77. 
The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, R.208-11, but denied the included Motion to Stay 
Discovery, and held that the first trial would be limited to the Plaintiffs Declaratory Relief count, 
and that any damages, accounting, breach of contract claims would be held later. Said trial was set 
for December 8 and 9, 2014 (after a stipulated continuance from the first setting date). R. 246-48. 
On November 12, 2014 Defendant moved to amend its Answer and Complaint to add a 
defense of statute of limitations and a claim for unjust enrichment. R. 267-83. After briefing and 
hearing, this Motion to Amend was withdrawn and the Defendant agreed to dismiss the Cross-Claim 
against Marti Kunz with prejudice, to dismiss the Counterclaim against Bret Kunz without prejudice. 
1The premise was alleged failure to pay life and health premiums sold by Marti Kunz; she 
was never licensed for property and casualty insurance. Although designated "Cross-claim 
Complaint" it was in fact a Third Party Complaint. 
2The record does not contain pages 2-4 of Plaintiffs' brief in opposition, but the courtesy 
copy was received by the judge. 
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Marti Kunz was added as a party Plaintiff with respect to her community interest in the subject 
contract. It was further stipulated that Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief 
11/20/14 hearing, p. 
LL. 17-25) 
Trial was held on December 8 and 9, 2014 and a trial transcript was requested, after which 
both parties submitted their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 427-438; 447-
477. Plaintiff also filed its Closing Argument Brief. R. 439-446. 
The Court, Honorable Mitchell Brown presiding, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Memorandum Decision on August 31, 2015. R. 497-529. In conclusion to that ruling, 
the second ,is states, "The Court recognizes that this is an interlocutory order, but that it likely is 
dispositive of Bret Kunz' claims for Breach of Contract; therefore, the Court will certify this matter 
for appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) should that be the desire of the parties." R. 526, second ,is. 
A "Declaratory Judgment" was entered on September 18, 2015. R. 565-67. On October 30, 
2015 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. R. 678-81. A "Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) 
Certificate" was entered on November 5, 2015, R. 687-90, and an Amended Notice of Appeal filed 
on November 12, 2015 R. 722-25. A "Judgment and Rule 54 Certificate" was filed on December 22, 
2015, R. 746-48 and R. 760-61.3 A Second Amended Notice of Appeal was filed by the Plaintiffs 
on December 28, 2015. Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Or Alter the Judgment on January 5, 
2016, R. 765-79, which was denied on January 30, 2016. R. 788-89. 
(iii) Statement of Facts. 
3This "Judgment" was in response to the conditional notice to dismiss appeal, R. 744-745, 
but then omits Bret Kunz' prevailing on his 3rd Claim of Declaratory Relief, i.e. that Defendant 
has no interest in his life and health business. 
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Generally speaking, Appellants do not take much umbrage with the lower Court's Findings 
except as hereafter argued. Since the Court had the benefit of a transcript, findings are 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of Law, 
they are incorporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
1. "B.Kunz [Bret Kunz] and M.Kunz [Marti Kunz] are husband and wife and resided in Bear 
Lake County, Idaho at all times germane to this proceeding. 
2. B.Kunz and M.Kunz own and operate an insurance business in Montpelier, Idaho doing 
business as Insurance Designers. B.Kunz and M.Kunz are both licensed insurance agents in 
the state of Idaho. 
3. N.I. [Nield, Inc.] is an Idaho corporation authorized to transact insurance business in the state 
of Idaho. N.I. 's principal place of business is in Pocatello, Idaho. N.I. also does business 
under the name Insurance Designers. N.I. is owned by two (2) brothers, Bryan Nield 
(B.Nield) and Benjamin Nield (Ben Nield). They purchased this corporation from their father 
Thomas Nield (T.Nield) in approximately 2009. Tr. p. 194. LL. 9-21. 
4. B.Kunz has been in the insurance business since approximately 1996 when began working 
for his brother, Michael 0. Kunz (M.0.Kunz). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 22 L.20 top. 23 L.I) 
5. In 1982, M.O.Kunz and N.I. entered into an "Agent Contract". The "Agent Contract" 
between M. 0 .Kunz and N .I. was to continue indefinitely "or as long as authorized by [N .I.' s] 
Board of Directors." Trial Exhibit (Tr. Ex.) 101, ,rIII. The "Agent Contract" between 
M.O.Kunz and N.I. outlined the duties and responsibilities ofM.O.Kunz under the "Agent 
Contract". Included among these responsibilities was the responsibility "to place insurance 
business through [N.I.] except for health and life policies that are individual company 
appointments." Id. at ,r V. The "Agent Contract" also outlined the responsibilities ofN.I. 
These responsibilities included, in part, maintaining contracts with insurance companies for 
placing insurance; and to provide the agent with an earned commission check based upon 
agreed percentage by the 15th of each month. Id. at ,r VI. The agreed upon commission 
between M. O.Kunz and N.I. was that "80% percent of the commission received on insurance 
placed" through N.I. would be paid to M.O.Kunz with N.I. receiving "20% percent of 
commission placed through" N.I. Finally, the "Agent Contract" also contained a provision 
4Additional references are added in parenthesis and italics. The District Court's findings 
and references to the transcript are cited verbatim otherwise. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 5 
with respect to ownership ofM.O.Kunz' of business which provided that N.I. "Owns 
u:,u1i.;;:,.- placed by [M.O.Kunz] through [N.I.] and M.0.Kunz owns 50%. Id. 
,rYII.s 
M.O.Kunz passed on to M.0.Kunz' death, B.Kunz operated as a 
sub-producer directly beneath M.O.Kunz. B.Kunz testified that the business arrange~ent that 
existed between him and M.O.Kunz, his older brother, was that he, B.Kunz, received the 
entire 80% commission to which M.O.Kunz was entitled under his "Agent Contract" with 
NJ. M.0.Kunz was providing B.Kunz with the office, computers an~ office ove~head. 
B.Kunz testified that other than M.0.Kunz receiving "any profit shanng or contingent 
commission" resulting from the sales attributable to B.Kunz, M.0.Kunz did not make "a 
dime off on" B.Kunz. Tr.,p. 27, LL. 27.6 In fact, because ofB.Kunz' business relationship 
with M.0.Kunz, N.I. and B.Kunz entered into an "Agent Contract" in 1996 as well. See Tr. 
Ex. 162.7 This "Agent Contract" mirrored the agreement that B.Kunz had with M.O.Kunz 
and paid B.Kunz "80% of commission received on insurance placed with" N.I. receiving 
20%. See Tr. Ex. 102. 
7. B.Kunz testified that he never received any profit sharing or contingent commission while 
operating as a sub-producer for M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 27, LL. 18-19. He testified further that he 
did not expect to receive or share in any profit sharing or contingent bonuses. Tr. P. 90, LL. 
21-23. The reason why B .Kunz did not expect to share in the bonuses is outlined in his cross-
examination testimony when he was asked to read from his prior deposition testimony. In 
doing so, his deposition testimony relates that the reason he did not receive bonuses under 
5The "Agent Contract" contains two (2) paragraphs numbered seven (7). The Ownership 
provisions are contained in the second of the two (2) paragraphs numbered seven (7). 
6 As outlined above, a certified copy of the transcript of these trial proceedings was 
prepared by the Court's Court Reporter, Rodney M. Felshaw. The Trial transcript consists of two 
(2) volumes: the first volume includes the testimony for the first day oftrial and consists of pages 
I through 262; the second volume includes the testimony for the second day of trial and consists 
of pages 263 through 427. The Court will cite to this transcript in these F.F.C.L. & M.D.O. as 
"Tr." followed by the relevant page and line numbers. 
7Although Tr. Ex. 102 purports to be signed on January l, 1982, the Court finds this to be 
a scrivener's error. B.Kunz' testimony is clear that he did not begin working in the insurance 
industry until 1996. See Tr. p., 23, LL. 24-25 and p. 24, L. 1. He also testified that this date was 
in error. See Tr., p. 132, LL. 24-25, p. 133, LL. 1-10. What appears to have happened is that N.I. 
used its Agent Contract with M.O.Kunz as a template for its Agent Contract with B.Kunz and in 
making the revisions, modifications and additions to the document in order to memorialize the 
parties' agreement, N.I. did not modify the date of the Agent Contract. This is supported not only 
by B.Kunz' testimony but by the fact that the date on M.0.Kunz' "Agent Contract" was January 
1, 1982. 
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the 1996 "Agent Contract" is because he "didn't own the book of business." Tr. P. 138, LL. 
Following M.0.Kunz' death, and M.Kunz purchased M.0.Kunz' share of the book 
business or "business placed" with NJ. and the insurance agency located 
in Montpelier from M.0.Kunz' surviving spouse, Judy Kunz. p. LL. and Tr. Ex. 
128. 
9. Around the time that B.Kunz and M.Kunz purchased M.O.Kunz' book of business and the 
insurance agency, B.Kunz and NJ. began to have discussions with NJ. concerning their 
business relationship. B.Kunz testified that a "ne\v contract became necessary that would 
include an ownership clause similar to the one contained in M.O.Kunz' "Agent Contract" 
with N.1. B.Kunz' 1996 "Agent Contract" did not contain an ownership clause. Tr., p. 33, 
LL. 4-8. B.Kunz testified that one of the advantages of being a sub-contractor or having an 
"Agent Contract" with N.1. was to gain access to better contracts with certain insurance 
companies. Tr., p. 98, LL. 22-25. 
10. B.Kunz testified that it was suggested by B.Nield that B.Nield and N.I. just sign the same 
contract that it had with M.O.Kunz. Tr., p. 34, LL. 5-7. Later, B.Kunz testified that he and 
M.Kunz wanted the same kind of contract that M.O.Kunz had with NJ. Tr., p. 132. LL. 16-
18. 
11. B.Kunz testified that in October of 2008, a draft of the prospective "Agent Contract" was 
prepared and brought, by B.Nield, to his office, in Montpelier, for his and M.Kunz' review. 
Tr., p. 33, LL. 13-25. B.Kunz testified that both he and M.Kunz closely reviewed the draft 
of the prospective "Agent Contract." See Tr. Ex. 103. B.Kunz testified that this draft of the 
prospective "Agent Contract" appeared, to him and M.Kunz, "to mirror the [Agent] Contract 
with [M.O.Kunz]. Tr. p. 34, LL. 4-8. 
12. B.Kunz testified that upon being presented with a draft of the prospective "Agent Contract" 
between B.Kunz and N.I., he was told that ifhe and M.Kunz "were okay with it, he [B.Nield] 
would take it back and put it on [N.I.'s] letterhead." Tr. p. 33, LL. 21-25. 
13. B.Kunz testified that following this meeting in October of 2008, he expected that the final 
document he was to be presented for signature would contain the terms of draft of the 
prospective "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and N.I. as reflected in Tr. Ex. 103. 
14. B.Nield testified that typically NJ. has its contracts on NJ. letterhead. He also stated that the 
language in Tr. Ex. 103 is similar to that contained in its contracts, but because it is not on 
N.I. letterhead, he "does not believe that [he] drafted it." Tr. p. 195, LL. 1-5. He also denied 
that he came to Montpelier and delivered it to B.Kunz and M.Kunz. Tr.,p. 195, LL. 5-7. 
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15. B.Kunz testified that during the latter part of October, 2008, or the early part of November, 
2008, T.Nield, B.Nield, and Ben Nield came to B.Kunz' office in Montpelier, Idaho. 
B.Kunz' testimony continues that he was presented with the "Agent Contracts" for himself 
and M.Kunz. B.Kunz explains that because had looked at draft [ or the prospective "Agent 
Contract" between B.Kunz and NJ. as reflected in Tr. 103] [he] did not look at that 
contract very closely." Tr. p. 35, LL. The "Agent Contract" for B.Kunz and M.Kunz 
were signed on this occasion. See Tr. Ex. 104 (M.Kunz "Agent Contract") and Tr. Ex. 105 
(B.Kunz "Agent Contract"). However, the "Agent Contract" reflects that the effective date 
of the contract is January 2009. 
16. The "Agent Contract" between B.Kunz and NJ. was drafted by B.Nield. Tr. p. 195, LL. 17-
19. 
17. B.Kunz also testified that on this occasion, B.Nield "mentioned ... that they had had some 
pretty good profit sharing checks with [M.0.Kunz]8 Tr. p. 35, LL. 15-16. 
18. The 2009 "Agent Contract" entered into between B.Kunz and N.I. contains the following 
provisions that are pertinent to the dispute of the parties: 
a. Paragraph 5 outlines the responsibilities of the agent, B.Kunz. These responsibilities 
include: (a) being identified as a subcontractor and having responsibility for all 
expenses related to his business, (b) placing all insurance business through N.I. and 
not through any other company, and ( c) responsibility for collection all premium and 
return commissions on business placed. The responsibility outlined in ( c) is clarified 
further by language stating that when collections are not on time, deductions may be 
made from payment of commissions due. When the collection is completed the 
deducted commission will be paid; 
b. Paragraph 6 outlines the responsibilities of N.I. These responsibilities include: (a) 
maintain contracts with companies for placing insurance, (b) provide the accounting 
and billing (except collections), ( c) provide B.Kunz with a 1099 Form showing 
annual earnings, (d) provide B.Kunz with a commission earned statement and 
8"Contingent commission" and "profit sharing" are phrases that appear to be used 
interchangeably in the insurance industry and certainly amongst the parties in this litigation. 
B.Kunz defines these phrases in the following terms: "Profit sharing, sometimes called 
'contingent commissions' is remuneration paid by the insurance company on generally an annual 
basis and predicated on a variety of facts, including written premium, loss ratios, and new 
business." Plaintifrs Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 5 ,i 23. Similarly, 
N.I. defines these phrases in the following fashion: "A contingent commission of profit sharing is 
a form of consumption that is different than monthly commission because the contingent 
commission or profit sharing is conditioned upon an agent meeting certain guidelines." 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, p. 9 ,i 35. 
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commission check based on agreed percentages on the 151h of each month,9 and ( e) 
other based upon commission split and individual agreement. See Tr. Ex. 
c. Paragraph 7 outlines the terms of compensation between B.Kunz and N .I. I~ provides 
that B.Kunz will receive 80 percent of the commission received by NJ. on msurance 
placed by B.Kunz with N.I., and NJ. will receive 20 percent of commissions placed 
by B.Kunz with NJ.; 
d. Finally, paragraph 8 outlines the ownership interest between N.I. and B.Kunz, 
providing that B.Kunz will own 50 percent of the book of business, and N .I. will own 
50 percent of the book of business. 
19. B.Kunz testified that after the "Agent Contract" was signed in late October, 2008 or early 
November, 2008, he had another discussion with B.Kunz [sic] where the subject of profit 
sharing came up. B.Kunz testified that this conversation took place between November of 
2008 and February of 2009, sometime before he received his first profit sharing check. Tr. 
p. 41, LL. 7-10. B.Kunz describes this conversation in the following manner: 
Yes, There was another time when Marti and I were down in the 
Pocatello office. I can't remember exactly what we were discussing, 
but Bryan and I went into his office, that used to be Tom Nield's 
office, to look something up. He was trying to motivate me and he 
made the comment of how nice the profit sharing checks were. 
Tr. p. 40, LL. 16-21. 
20. B.Kunz testified that the first year following his purchasing the agency and entering into the 
2009 "Agent Contract" with N.I., he received profit sharing as it relates to Gem State 
Insurance Company. Tr. p. 43, LL. 5-7. This Gem State Insurance profit sharing for 2008 is 
documented in Tr. Ex. 115. 10 B.Kunz testified that this documentation represents profit 
9The 2009 Agent Contracts for B.Kunz and M.O.Kunz are substantively identical. Tr. p. 
34, LL. 23-25, p. 35, L. 1. However, on each of these contracts, three (3) lines at the beginning of 
the second page are illegible because the content of the contract is placed on the page in such a 
manner that the Insurance Designer letterhead blocks out the language of the parties' agreement. 
However, based upon the testimony of the parties and by utilizing Tr. Ex. 101, and 103, as well 
as attempting to decipher the blocked content on Tr. Ex. 's I 04 and I 05, the Court concludes that 
the blocked content reads as outline in sub-paragraph 2( d). 
10By way of a post script at the bottom of Tr. Ex. 115, it states that the profit sharing 
check in the sum of $2,900.00 was sent to the Pocatello office, presumably the office ofN.I. The 
Court notes that Tr. Ex 115 does not address how this $2,900.00 was split between B.Kunz and 
N.I. However, B.Kunz testified that it was based upon a 50/50 percentage split. Tr. p. 44, LL. 16-




sharing earned in 2008, but paid out in Tr. p. 43, LL. 5-7. 11 
B.Kunz testified that profit sharing from Gem State Insurance 
Company in 2009 due to the number within his book of business. ~ad B.Kunz 
qualified, these would have been paid in Tr. LL. B.Kunz testified furt?er 
that he did not receive profit sharing or contingent commissions in 20 l 0, for profit sharmg 
earned in 2009 from any other company. Tr. p. L. 24. 
B.Kunz did qualify for profit sharing through Gem State Insurance Company again in 2010, 
with payment being made in 2011. Tr. p. 43, L. 25, p. 44, LL. 1-3. Tr. Ex. 106 reflects a 
Memo from B.Nield to B.Kunz, dated March 22, 2022, reflecting profit sharing for 2010 for 
d A ' 12 both Gem State Insurance Company an 1·\.cmty. 
On April 10, 2012, B.Kunz received a Memo from B.Nield outlining profit sharing for 
2011.13 See Tr. Ex 107. This Memo reflected profit sharing from Gem State Insurance and 
20. This is confirmed byB.Nield. Tr. P. 202, LL. 5-7. 
11It should be noted that the Gem State Insurance book of business is exclusively written 
by B.Kunz out of his Montpelier office. N.I. does not write Gem State insurance. So the 
commission earned from Gem State as well as any profit sharing or contingent bonus would have 
resulted 100% from policies written out of B.Kunz' office in Montpelier, Idaho. Tr. p. 45, LL. 
21-25, p. 46. 
12 Again, this Memo does not reflect the amount of the profit sharing or contingent 
commission paid to N.I. or the percentage split between N.I. and B.Kunz. B.Kunz testified that 
the Gem State Insurance Company profit sharing was paid on a 50/50 percentage and that he 
does not know on what percentage the Acuity profit sharing was paid, but believes he was only 
paid 22% of what he should have been paid. Tr. p. 44, LL. 10-13, p. 48, LL. 4-25, p. 49, LL. 1-2. 
B.Kunz takes the position that he did not agree that he should be paid on a 50/50 percentage 
basis and instead argues that he should be paid on an 80/20 percentage with him receiving 80% 
and N.i. receiving 20%. Tr. p. 44, LL. 18-20. B.Kunz testified that this issue was raised in a 
telephone conversation with B.Kunz where B.Nield took the position that profit sharing or 
contingent commissions was to be based upon ownership percentages, not commission 
percentages. Tr. p. 44, LL. 21-22. Later in his testimony, B.Kunz suggests that he was mistaken 
in his earlier testimony and that this conversation occurred following payment of the first profit 
sharing from Gem State Insurance Company in 2009 for profit sharing earned in 2008. See Tr. p 
178, LL. 4-13. 
13The Memo itself incorrectly reflects that this is for profit sharing for 2010. However, the 
Court accepts B.Kunz' explanation that this is actually for profit sharing in 2011 and N.I. 's 
stipulation to this fact. See Tr. p. 49, LL. 1 p. 50, LL. 1-5. 
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Alliance. 14 B.Kunz testified that the profit sharing for Gem State Insurance reflected a 50/50 
percentage split, but that the profit sharing Alliance was less than 10 percent of the 80 
percent split which he believes he should have received. Tr., p. LL 12-22. 
In 2003, the issue concerning the profit sharing or contingent commission issue became 
objectively apparent. B.Kunz sent B.Nield a letter addressing this issue. This letter was dated 
January 16, 2013 and addressed the Gem State Insurance profit sharing for 2012. See Tr. Ex. 
108. In this letter B.Kunz enclosed the profit sharing check from Gem State Insurance in the 
sum of $4,722.00 B.Kunz further advises that the profit sharing split should be "on the same 
basis as the commissions, 80/20. B.Kunz noted that this issue, presumably the percentage 
split, was never addressed in the contract with M.O.Kunz or himself. Id. B.Nield responded 
to B.Kunz' letter, Tr. Ex. 108, byway of a document titled Memo date January 22, 2013. See 
Tr. Ex. 109. B.Nield's Memo acknowledges that there is nothing in the "Agent Contract" 
concerning the issue (again the Court concludes this is a reference to the percentage split). 
He continues by including a paragraph concerning his position on profit sharing. This 
paragraph provides as follows: 
Let me share my thoughts. Profit sharing is a bonus based on loss 
ratios and book of business as you know. It is not based on 
commissions. The reason we have split profit sharing 50/50 is based 
on ownership, not commissions, and there are not guarantees on 
profit sharing. 
Tr. Ex. 109. At the conclusion of this Memo, B.Nield relents and sends B.Kunz a 
check for profit sharing, as relates to Gem State Insurance and its profit sharing for 
2012, in the sum of $3,777.00. However, this appears to the Court to be a one-time 
acquiescence and showing of good faith on the part ofB.Nield and N.l. 15 Based upon 
the content of the letter, it is clear that N.L is not conceding that the profit sharing or 
contingent bonus split should be an 80/20 percentage split, with B.Kunz receiving the 
80 percent. 16 
25. In April 2013, the issue of profit sharing or contingent commission earned in 2012 continued 
14AI1iance is also referred to at times in the testimony and exhibits as Farmers Alliance. 
15The Court chooses to characterize this acquiescence in these terms. Certainly the parties 
were in a business relationship and attempting to resolve this dispute. The Court recognizes that 
now that the parties are in litigation, B.Nield chooses to characterize it in different terms 
("because it's not worth the fight"). Tr., p. 209, LL. 22-23. 
16This dialogue continued with B.Kunz replying to B.Nield's Memo. B.Kunz sent B.Nield 
a letter dated April 5, 2013 further explaining his position regarding the 80/20 percentage split 
vis a vis the 50/50 percentage split dispute. 
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to escalate. B.Kunz received a check from N.I. in the sum of $424.00. See Tr. Ex. 111, p. 
The description of the check reflects that this check is for profit sharing, but does not identify 
for which insurance company. B.Kunz sent B.Nield an e-mail on April 17, 2013 
concerning this check thanking the profit sharing check, asking that the insurance 
company be identified, and inquiring concerning what the split percentage was. B.Kunz also 
asked that he be provided with the profit sharing agreements in place with all of the 
insurance companies. B.Kunz testified that B.Nield never responded to this e-mail and that 
ultimately M.Kunz called B.Nield and obtained the information about the profit sharing 
check in question. This was a profit sharing check from Acuity. Apparently the percentage 
split and profit sharing agreements were not provided or disclosed as requested by B.Kunz. 18 
26. Tr. Ex. 113 reflects contingent commissions paid to N.1. by Farmers AJliance Insurance 
Company for the years at issue in this litigation, 2008 through 2012. Tr., p. 58, LL. 23-25, 
p. 59, LL. 1-2. B.Kunz testified that during this time frame he only received on (1) profit 
sharing or contingent commission check associated with Farmers Alliance Insurance and that 
was in 2012 for 2011. See Tr. Ex. 107 and Finding of Fact No. 22. Tr. Ex. 114 reflects 
contingent commission paid to N.I. by Acuity for the years at issue in this litigation, 2008 
through 2012. Tr. p. 59, LL. 16-21. B.Kunz testified that during this time frame he only 
received two (2) profit sharing or contingent commission checks, one for 2010 (See Tr. Ex. 
106 and Finding of Fact No. 21) and another for 2012 (See Tr. Ex. 111 and Finding of Fact 
No. 24). Finally, B.Kunz also contends that he is entitled to contingent commission or profit 
sharing from Allied Insurance during the operative years, 2008 through 2012. Tr. p. 52, LL. 
2-25, p. 53, L. I. 
B.Kunz testified that the formula by which he feels his share of contingent commissions or 
profit sharing should be calculated under the "Agent Contract" with N.I. is as follows: 
I would take the total written premium. So for example, let's say the 
total written premium with Acuity was $200,000. If I wrote [sic] 
$100,000 of that then I would - and Jet's say the total contingent 
payment was I 0,000 and my book of business would have been 
responsible for that I would take 80 percent of that 5,000. 
Tr. p. 60, LL. 4-12. 
_
118.Kunz testified that the handwriting on page two (2) of this exhibit, is that of M.Kunz. 
He testified that she wrote this information on the document upon obtaining the same from 
B.Nield. 
• 
18B.Kunz testified that since this litigation has been commenced and through the 
discovery process he has obtained and reviewed information upon which he believes the 2012 
profit sharing payment in the sum of $424.00 does not amount to either a 50% or 80% split. Tr. 
p. 56, LL. 2-8. 
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B.Kunz testified that at the time he signed and entered into the 2009 "Agent Contract" he 
believed, and that his intent was, that he would receive an 80% split of whatever N.I. was 
paid off of the insurance business that he sold, including contingent commission or profit 
sharing. Tr. p. 95, He testified further that in some years NJ. would not have 
qualified for contingent bonuses or sharing certain companies, Acuity, Farmers 
Alliance and Gem State Insurance, without his sales being combined with N.I.'s sales. 
p. 95, LL. 11-23. This fact is supported by the testimony ofB.Nield. Tr. p. 200, LL. 11-23. 
29. B.Nield in his testimony asserted that NJ. does not pay profit sharing or contingent 
commissions. Tr. p. 201, LL. 4-9. At trial, B.Nield chose to characterize the payments NJ. 
made to B.Kunz and reflected in Tr. Ex.' s 106, 107, 109, and 111 as "profit sharing" as a 
"bonus". Tr. p. 201, LL. 19-25. 
30. Effectively B.Nield admitted that NJ. paid B.Kunz 50% of the profit sharing received from 
Gem State Insurance Company and NJ. was retaining 50% of the profit sharing from Gem 
State Insurance Company. Tr. p. 201, LL. 24-25, p. 202, LL. 1-7. 
31. This separate or "individual agreement" is not to be found and is not contained in the parties' 
"Agent Contract". 
32. B.Nield goes on to explain his rationale for this arrangement or "individual agreement" in 
the following terms: 
Gem State is a separate issue by itself. They pay him his - the whole 
book ofbusiness is totally separate from ours. Therefore anything that 
he would receive as profit sharing is paid directly to Bret from Gem 
State. I believe Allstate is the same way, but I don't think we've seen 
Allstate I've never seen an Allstate profit sharing check. 
So based on Gem State paying him, since we own 50 percent of his 
book of business, therefore, we receive 50 percent of the profit 
sharing. Tr. p. 215, LL. 23-25, p. 216, LL. 1-8. 19 
33. B.Nield described in his testimony the manner in which N.I. pays out "bonuses" with respect 
to other insurance carriers such as Acuity, Alliance, and Allied. He described this process in 
the following terms: 
19This particular finding of fact is supported by what Bryan Nield said but to the extent 
that this witness purports that Bret is paid directly by Gem State, that is inco;ect. The profit 
sharing check is sent to Bret Kunz, but made payable to Nield, Inc. and is simply forwarded. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 51, LL. 21-25, p. 52, LL. 1- 10; p. 59, LL. 7-9. Note, this footnote was not part of the 
Court's original findings and is added thereto. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 13 
As I explained before, what we do is get together and take any profits 
that earned. And if we decide to give out bonuses then we 
decide what - we take and pay money to the company, see what is 
left, and determine what amount to a bonus to whoever we 
feel it is necessary. 
Tr. p. 202, LL. 10-15. B.Nield clarifies this testimony by stating that N.I. would not 
pay a bonus to a sub-agent unless N.I. had first received a profit sharing from the 
insurance company. Tr. p. 204, LL. 10-11." 
[record citations added in italics to original] 
- End Court's Findings ofFact-
Although the Court appears thorough in its Findings of Fact, it ignored significant facts in 
the record. For example, Ben Nield, co-owner of Nield, Inc., testified that Nield, Inc. did not have 
in place any separate agreement with Bret for additional compensation. Tr. Vol. II, p. 367, LL. 9-11. 
The crux of this case is not some hypothecated side agreement for profit sharing, but that 
profit sharing is a part and parcel of the only contract between the parties, that of the "Agent 
Contract" in question. Defendant's own expert witness, Stephen Ahl, testified: 
THE COURT: I'm going to ask two questions just so you'll be able to cross on my 
questions, Mr. Wuthrich. 
Are you aware-you talked about contingent commission or profit sharing with 
agencies who have a contract with Allied, correct? 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
THE COURT: And that the contingent commission or profit sharing are paid to the 
agencies, correct? 
THE WITNESS: Correct. 
THE COURT: If there is a subagent or a producer that works for the agent, are you 
aware of any of those agencies who share in the profit sharing or contingent 
commission with those producers or agents? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: That does happen? 
THE WITNESS: It does. 
THE COURT: All right. That's all I have. 
Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL. 24, 25, p. 359, LL. 1-15. 
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In addition to the use of the word "commissions" Bret Kunz testified that the language of 
""'"'""'" 6 of the Agent Agreement, "other functions based on commission split" would also entail 
I, 100, L 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. DID THE COURT ERR IN CONSIDERING BRYAN NIELD'S UNDISCLOSED 
SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN CONSTRUING THE SUBJECT CONTRACT? 
II. DID THE COURT MISCONSTRUE THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING 
UNDER THE AGENT CONTRACT IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS A SIDE 
AGREEMENT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS 
TO BRET KUNZ, RATHER THAN UTILIZING THE PARTIES' COURSE OF 
DEALING TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT AMBIGUITY? 
III. DID THE COURT ERR IN IGNORING THE "OTHER FUNCTIONS" LANGUAGE 
OF THE SUBJECT AGENT CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR 
PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS? 
IV. DIDTHECOURTERRINCONCLUDINGTHATPROFITSHARINGPAYMENTS 
SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE RATHER THAN 
THE COMMISSION SPLIT SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT? 
V. DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE AGENT CONTRACT 
AGAINST THE DRAFTER, NIELD, INC.? 
VI. DID THE COURT ERR IN ITS JUDGMENT FORM BY NOT ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE APPELLANTS PREVAILED IN PART IN THE DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT? 
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Attorney's Fees on Appeal. 
The Appellants claim entitlement to attorney's fees in the underlying action predicated on 
not personal, family or household 
matters. Although bifurcated below, and certified under Rule 54 for purposes of appeal, Appellants 
stand ready to prove their 10-day notice preceding the filing of this action at such time as the case 
is concluded. AppeBants should be entitled to their attorney's fees on appeal, as well, under 12-
120(5). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. Standards on Review. 
As was stated in Pocatello Hospital, LLC., v. Quail Ridge Medical Center, 156 Idaho 709, 
330 P.3d 1067 (2014): 
When reviewing a trial court's decision following a bench trial, this Court's 
review is limited to determining the following: 
[W]hether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and 
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions oflaw. A district 
court's findings of fact in a bench trial is to be liberally construed on 
appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district court's 
role as the finder of fact. It is the province of the district judge acting 
as trier of fact to weight the conflicting evidence and testimony and 
judge the credibility of witnesses. We will not substitute our view of 
the facts for the view of the district court. Instead where findings of 
fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is 
conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. We 
exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of law, 
however, to determine whether the court correctly stated the 
applicable law , and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by 
the facts found. Pocatello Hospital, supra, at 156 Idaho 714, 330 
P.3d. 1072; Clayson v Zebe, 153 Idaho 228,232,280 P.3d 731, 735 
(2012) 
As noted earlier, Appellants herein do not take umbrage with the facts found by the trial 
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court, but does disagree with the statement law as applied by the lower court and with the 
conclusions reached, specifically that 
B. Argument. 
are to the facts as found. 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING BRYAN NIELD'S UNDISCLOSED 
SUBJECTIVE INTENT IN CONSTRUING THE SUBJECT CONTRACT. 
The Court cited Beus v. Beus, 151 Idaho 235, 238, 254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011) in its 
Conclusion of Law ,I 16, for the proposition that, "The determination of the parties' intent with 
respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by looking at the contract as a whole, the 
language used in the document, the circumstances under which it was made, the objective and 
purpose of the particular provision, and any construction placed upon it by the contracting parties 
as shown by their conduct or dealings."' R. 515-16. However, the Court overlooked the remainder 
of that principle cited in Beus that "[A] party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the 
interpretation of a contract." Beus, supra at 1234, citing toJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 
167 P.3d 748 (2006). Pocatello Hospital, supra, at 156 Idaho 720, 330 P.3d. 1078. [Emphasis 
added.] 
In the present case, the District Court virtually conceded that Nield, Inc. and/or its agents 
never disclosed that the payments they labeled as "profit sharing" when they sent them to Bret Kunz 
were purportedly bonuses, and in fact the District Court did not even believe Bryan Nield's 
testimony in that regard. Specifically, Judge Brown stated in footnote 24 of the Conclusions of Law: 
The Court recognizes that these claims by B.Kunz concerning statements made by 
B.Nield are disputed and that B.Nield denies making said statements. However, the 
Court has determined that B.Kunz' testimony is more credible and reliable on these 
points and accepts his testimony as being accurate and truthful on these points. There 
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are a number of reasons for the Court's determination on this point, chief among 
them being that long before the litigation was filed or even contemplated by these 
parties, B.Nield and N.I. freely used the term profit sharing in dealing with B.Kunz 
with respect to Gem State Insurance, and Farmers Alliance. Not only was this 
term used on check receipts (B.Nield testified that the phrase profit sharing was used 
on some documents generated byN.L, because of its accounting software). See Tr. 
Ex. 111, p. 2, it was also freely used in B.Nield's Memo's to B.Kunz. See Tr. Ex. 's 
106, 107, and 109. Never once. prior to this litigation. did B.Nield dispute, correct 
or suggest to B.Kunz that profit sharing was not part of their relationship and that 
B.Kunz was off base in his understanding that there was profit sharing. It is 
inconceivable to this Court, that a business. such as N.I., and/or a principal in said 
business. such as B.Nield, would allow a partner or colleague such as B.Kunz to 
continue uncorrected when it was so clear that he believed that he was entitled to 
profit sharing. The dialogue was never about whether profit sharing existed, but the 
amount of the split. See Tr. Ex.'s 108, 109, and 110. [emphasis added] 
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that there was a separate agreement, apart from 
the non-integrated Agent Contract, with respect to profit sharing or contingent bonuses to Bret Kunz 
with respect to Gem State insurance (Conclusion of Law ,r 28, R. 519-20), but denied there was any 
legally enforceable agreement for Bret Kunz to receive profit sharing, contingent commissions or 
bonuses from Nield, Inc. with respect to Acuity, Alliance or Allied, and specifically concluded 
those payments appeared to have been paid out as a gratuitous bonus. (Conclusion, first 
paragraph 5, R. 526.) By so ruling, the Court accepted the "subjective, undisclosed intent" of Bryan 
Nield in interpreting the contract, contrary and wholly inconsistent with the guidelines set for in 
Beus, supra, because there is no other basis in the record for supporting this conclusion other than 
Bryan Nield's subjective and undisclosed statement of intent in paying what he specifically labeled 
as "profit sharing" payments to Bret Kunz. 
The objective facts are that Bret Kunz received profit sharing for 201 O for both Gem State 
and Acuity, labeled as profit sharing by Bryan Nield, Ex. 106. 
Bret Kunz received profit sharing from Bryan Nield for 2011 for both Gem State and 
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Alliance. Ex. Again, this was labeled as sharing. Bret Kunz received profit sharing for 
State for and argued in writing with Bryan Nield about the proper that 
sharing should split 
ownership, not commissions, and therefore must be split 50i50. Nevertheless, Bryan Nield conceded 
and split the profit sharing 80/20 in favor of Bret Kunz. Ex. 109. 
Bret Kunz also received a profit sharing check from Acuity for 2012, ( again labeled by Nield. 
Inc., as profit sharing) but the Kunz office had to call to verify for which insurance company the 
profit sharing check was attributable. Ex. 111.20 
The District Court was in clear error by considering, to any degree, the subjective, 
undisclosed intent of Bryan Nield about said payments which, only in litigation, did he term as 
"bonuses". Nowhere in the record is there even a scintilla of evidence that Nield, Inc., or its agents 
ever disclosed to Bret Kunz that they intended any of the foregoing payments as a "bonus". 21 This 
case is even more egregious than the cited authorities. Beus, supra, the case referenced by the 
District Court below, cited the principle that an undisclosed, subject intent was immaterial, was 
predicated on J.R. Simplot, supra, at 151, which stated: 
A parties' subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a 
contract. As explained in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 347 (2004): 
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the 
interpretation of a contract, as under the objective law of contract 
20Bret Kunz never received any profit sharing checks related to Alliance, but maintains in 
this action a right to same should the case proceed to the damages portion of the bifurcated 
proceedings. 
21 0rdinarily this counsel would be making the arguments that the trial court's findings 
were not supported by the evidence, but ironically the District Court below found in favor of the 
Kunzs, but concluded contrary to its own findings of fact. 
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interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of the 
contract without regard to what the parties to the contract thought it 
meant or what they actually intended for it to mean. The court will 
not attempt to ascertain the actual material processes of the parties in 
entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the 
parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the 
intention which its terms manifest. 
In this case, Bosen does not contend he ever verbalized to any of Simplot's 
agents his intent not to be personally obligated ,;mder the contract. His subjective 
intent or beiief does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
In the instant action, not only did Bryan Nield, or any Nield, Inc. agent, not express their 
intent that payments to Bret Kunz were gratuitous bonuses, they expressed precisely the opposite, 
that the payments were Bret Kunz' profit sharing [split] and disguised the payments in uneven 
amounts so that Kunz couldn't possibly have even guessed that they were some arbitrary bonus. The 
Court realized this fact, found Kunz' testimony to be credible and Bryan Nield's testimony not 
credible, but nevertheless considered immaterial evidence in construing the subject contract. 
Nowhere in the record, prior to this litigation, is there any evidence whatsoever that the payments 
labeled as "profit sharing" by Nield, Inc. were bonuses, and the Court erred in even considering such 
a deceitful lie. 22 
22This counsel cannot resist the urge to take a soapbox and argue the public policy against 
encouraging false testimony in court. We have reached a point in our society where politicians, 
lawyers and trusted officials are allowed to put a "spin" on everything. However, the courtroom 
should preserve a modicum of honesty and truthfulness, less the judicial system degenerate into 
anarchy. People should not be allowed to take the sacred oath, and explain away their conduct 
with what is obviously, patently untruthful testimony. Have we, as a society, deteriorated to the 
point where, in the name of politeness, we no longer call a liar a liar? If we have, it's a sad 
commentary. Moreover, in this case, to have the judge recognize the falsity of Bryan Nield 's 
statements and conduct, but reward him with judgment nevertheless predicated thereon, is a 
travesty, not just for Bret Kunz, but for the judicial system. Doesn't this encourage everybody to 
lie in the courtroom? What benefit is served by that? 
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II. THE COURT MISCONSTRUED THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING UNDER 
THE AGENT CONTRACT IN CONCLUDING THERE WAS A SIDE AGREEMENT 
AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS TO BRET 
KUNZ, RATHER THAN UTILIZING THE PARTIES' COURSE OF DEALING TO 
INTERPRET THE CONTRACT AMBIGUITY. 
The Court appeared to be seeking a hypothetical "side agreement" to explain the parties' 
course of dealings, rather than recognize that said conduct reflects the parties own interpretation of 
the word "commission". 
A review of the actual contract document language is appropriate. The signed contract provides: 
4) Relationship: The association existing between Company and Agent. This 
association is not an Employer/Employer relationship. The agent is a sub-contractor 
and the company provides markets through which an agent can place insurance 
business. 
5) Responsibilities of Agent: The agent is a sub-contractor and as such has 
responsibility for all expenses related to his or her business. This includes, but is not 
limited to, federal, state, FICA, unemployment, and local taxes. The Company will 
provide to the Agent a 1099 Form showing annual earnings. The agent is responsible 
for Workers Compensation Insurance on self and employees. Agent is to place all 
insurance business through company. 23 Company has final underwriting authority for 
all business placed. Agent has responsibility for own health, life and other personal 
insurances. Agent may not place insurance business through another company. Agent 
is responsible for all premium and return commissions on business placed. When 
collections are not on time, deduction may be made from payment of commissions 
due. When the collection is completed the deducted commission will be paid. 
. 231n the Michael Kunz contract the contract provides, "Agent is to place insurance 
bus1~ess through company except health and life policies that are individual company 
appo1~tments. Agent is responsible to be familiar with and follow underwriting, binding 
authonty and other guidelines of insurance carriers represented by the Company." This language 
also appears in Bret Kunz original contract, Exhibit 102, and the draft agreement, Exhibit 103, 
but was changed unbeknownst to Bret and Marti Kunz in the final agreement, Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, 
LL. 1-8, Ex. 103; p. 35, LL. 2-21, Ex. 105. 
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6) Responsibilities of Company: Company will maintain contracts with companies 
for placing of insurances. Company will do all billing and accounting functions 
(except collections). Agent is personally responsible for the collection of premiums 
and returned commissions on business placed. The company will provide to the agent 
a 1099 Form showing annual earnings. Company will provide agent with a 
commission earned statement and commission check based on the agreed percentages 
on the 151h of each month.24 Other functions based on commission split and 
individual agreement.. 
7) Terms of Compensation: Agent will receive 80 percent of commissions received 
on insurance placed by agent with companv. Comoany will receive 20 percent of 
commissions placed by agent with company. 
8) Ownership: This is subject to change, but only as agreed between Company and 
Agent. The agent will own 50% of the book of business and the company will own 
50% of the book of business. If agent decides to sell his percent of ownership, the 
company has first right of refusal at a price determined at the time of sale. If company 
refuses to purchase, the agent may sell his percentage of ownership to a licensed and 
qualified agent for the State of Idaho and must be approved by the company. A 
covenant not to compete will be included in the contract of sale. 
8) Errors and Omissions: Agent will keep in force Errors and Omissions insurance 
on agent and employees. This coverage will25 be purchased as a part of the Errors and 
Omissions policy maintained by company. The agent is responsible for all premiums 
and deductibles assessed by the policy. It is understood that the Errors and Omissions 
policy maintained by the company is only for insurance placed through the company. 
Exhibit 104, Marti Kunz, and 105, Bret Kunz. 
Although the District Court below seemed to view all the contracts as synonymous, distinct 
differences were in fact made between the draft version and the final contract and the final contract 
signed by Bret and Marti is not a mirror image of the Michael Kunz contract. It was obviously Bryan 
24 The actual language of the foregoing two sentences is not readable on the contact (Ex. 
104 or 105) because it appears overprinted with Nield, Inc., letterhead, but is deciphered from 
the draft version, (Ex. 103) 
25The contracts as signed contain the word "will", whereas all of the previous contracts 
and the draft contain the word "may". See and compare Ex. 101, 102 and 103 with 104 and 105. 
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Nield's intent to bind Bret and Marti to different terms, (specifically to get his hands on the life and 
commissions) than Nield, Inc., had Michael Kunz. 
Court acknowledged that gre:em,em is ambiguous its use of the word 
"commissions", but ultimately construed the contract in the narrowest light in favor of Nield, Inc. 
This construction flies in the face of the both the expressed intent contemporaneous with the signing 
of the instrument, and the parties' course of dealing with each other subsequent thereto. 
The Court stated in Conclusion No. 26 (R.519) that there was a statement about how good 
profit sharing checks Nield Inc., had with Michael Kunz made by Bryan Nield at the time of the 
signing of the subject contracts with Bret and Marti Kunz. The Court went on to elucidate in 
footnote 24 of the Conclusions that the Court believed Bret's testimony over Bryan Nield's denial 
of any such statements. Although designated as a "Conclusion" that portion of,J 26 is obviously a 
factual determination of credibility of witnesses and must be accepted as true by this Court. 
Prior to that time [the signing of the subject contracts in the fall of 2008] Bret had not 
received any profit sharing or bonus checks under his 1996 contract. Tr. Vol. I, p. 138, LL. 4-19; See 
also p. 27, LL. 14-19. Therefore, there was no right to receive profit sharing under the 1996 contract, 
the Court reasons, but suddenly, on the day Bret and Marti Kunz sign the contract, Bryan Nield is 
talking about profit sharing payments. If Bret has no right to profit sharing by virtue of the agreement 
just that very moment entered into by Bret and Nield, Inc., what's the point of Bryan Nield 
mentioning it? The only thing that has changed, is that Bret has just signed a contract under which 
26Nield, Inc. filed both counterclaim against Bret Kunz and a cross-claim against Marti 
Kunz fo.r those premiums (life and health). It was not until three weeks before trial that Nield, 
Inc. capitulated and agreed that it had no interest in the Kunz' life and health business. This 
further demonstrates the sharp practice by which Nield, Inc. dealt with Plaintiffs. 
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is a 50/50 owner the book of business the Montpelier office. If that ownership interest 
entitle him to profit 
alleged "side agreement" come 
under the Agent's contract, when exactly did this 
it suddenly from the sky between the time 
Bret lifted his pen off the signature line of the Agent Contract and when Bryan Nield started talking 
about profit sharing payments in that same meeting, sort of an "immaculate [ contact] conception" 
as it were? 
How did this alleged "side agreement" come into being? The Court states that: 
28. As a result of the foregoing, this Court concludes that Bret K has Kunz 
established a course of dealing with B. Nield, a representative and principal ofNield, 
Inc., sufficient to establish an agreement, separate and apart from their non-integrated 
"Agent Contract" (an "individual agreement" as discussed in paragraph 6) for the 
payment of profit sharing or contingent commission bonuses to B. Kunz with respect 
to Gem State Insurance. R. 519-520. 
The "foregoing" to which the Court refers must necessarily be conclusions 25, 26, and 
27,(R.518-519) which acknowledge profit sharing payments received by Bret Kunz from Acuity and 
Alliance as well. If the profit sharing payments are not part of the Agent Contract signed in 2008, 
what was the point of the profit sharing references made by Bryan Nield at the time of signing the 
Agent Contract and found to have been said by the Court? Was this some prophetic comment that 
Bryan Nield knew, somehow, in the distant future the parties would establish an implied contract 
based upon a course of dealing that had not yet even begun to happen? 
Clearly the Court has ignored its own factual findings about what was said contemporaneous 
27 Bret received his first profit sharing check in 2009, for the 2008 year. Tr. Vol. I, p.53, 
LL. 2-9; Ex, 115. A fortiori, under the trial court's reasoning, this "side agreement" must have 
already been created based upon???? The parties had years of prior dealings under the 1996 
contract with Bret receiving no profit sharing, and the record is wholly devoid of any testimony 
about any profit sharing "course of dealing" in 2008. 
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the signing in favor of the [legally immaterial], undisclosed and subjective intent of Bryan Nield 
that profit sharing payments made by Nield, 
to correct that error as a matter of law. 
are just gratuitous bonuses. The District Court has 
making this conclusion, and this Court is free 
Statements made contemporaneous with the signing of a non integrated contract are material 
to its interpretation. Where a document is ambiguous then evidence as to the meaning of the 
instrument maybe submitted tothetrieroffact. Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 166, 335 p.3d 
1, 11 (2014);KnipeLand Co., v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,455,259 P.3d 595,601 (2011); See also, 
Johnson Cattle Company v. Idaho First National Bank, 110 Idaho 604, 607 716 P.2d 1376, 1379 
(1986)(oral agreement reached during telephone conversation would be admissible to determine 
meaning and full import of the Subordination Agreement). 
In this case, the trier of fact simply ignored the fact that the parties themselves were 
recognizing that the term "commission", as utilized in paragraph 7 of the Agent Contract, included 
profit sharing or contingent commissions when the District Court made its conclusions. Not only 
would the contemporaneous statements made by Bryan Nield be an absurdity if were not so, but his 
entire course of dealing recognized and specified the right of Bret Kunz to receive profit sharing 
payments. Bryan Nield only disputed the predicate split upon which those payments should be paid. 28 
"The conduct of the parties to a contract and their practical interpretation of 
it is an important factor when there is a dispute over its meaning." Mountainview 
Landowners Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 865, 136 P.3d 332, 336 
(2006). Because the parties used this percentage in prior dealings, it is reasonable, 
and equitable, to likewise use it as the factor for the equitable adjustment. Moreover, 
28 Well at least up to the point Bryan Nield got caught with his hand in the cookie jar, and 
then when this litigation ensued, his position changed to the alleged "gratuitous bonus" theory, a 
matter wholly immaterial to the contract interpretation issue as argued in Issue I herein. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 25 
the proper time for haggling over the adjustment metric was during co~tr~ct 
formation. As a sophisticated party, the City took a risk, ex ante, by not specifying 
how the adjustment would be calculated. It could have drafted its own preferred 
metric, but for whatever reason it did not. It thus cannot credibly argue now, ex post, 
that the adjustment chosen by the district court is unsuitable. In any event, the district 
court's percentage-based adjustment conforms with the parties' prior conduct and, 
thus, is proper. We therefore affirm. [Emphasis added.] 
City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., supra at 299 P.3d 246. In this case, the parties did agree as to the 
percentage commissions were to be split, i.e. 80/20. The course of dealing demonstrates that the 
parties themselves recognized that the term "commissions" included contingent commissions or 
profit sharing payments. Although they disputed the percentage split throughout thei: course of 
dealing, there was never a dispute about entitlement to profit sharing expressed in any of the 
communications between the parties from 2009 until this litigation commenced in 2013. 
The Court concluded that because the payments were neither 50/50 nor 80/20 with respect 
to Acuity and Alliance, that there must not be an implied in fact contract for contingent commissions 
with respect to those companies, distinguishing Gem State. The only real distinction between Gem 
State and the other two companies upon which Nield, Inc. expressly paid profit sharing payments 
is that because the check came to Bret Kunz directly from Gem State (albeit payable to Nield, Inc.), 
Bret Kunz would have knowledge of the aggregate amount of the profit sharing payment, whereas 
with the other two companies all of the accounting information was exclusively within the domain 
of Nield, Inc. Tr. Vol. I, p. 51, LL. 21-25, p. 52, LL. 1- 10; p. 59, LL. 7-9. The reason that the 
Acuity payments and the Alliance payments are not congruent with either 80/20 or 50/50 is because 
Nield, Inc. was deceiving Bret Kunz, knowing he wouldn't have access to information by which he 
could discover the deception. There can only be one logical and rational explanation for making the 
payments in such arbitrary and uneven amounts. The Court recognized this in footnote 28 of its 
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Conclusions of Law. There is no reasonable rationale for distinguishing the profit sharing payments 
All three companies are property and casualty companies, I, 94, LL. I Vol. II, 
p. 285, LL. 5-9. All three companies are a part of the 50% book of business owned by Nield, Inc. and 
Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 9-12. See also, Tr. Vol. II, p. 285, LL. 10-12. All three companies 
require specific goals be met in order to qualify for contingent commissions or profit sharing 
payments, Tr. Vol. I, p. 175, LL. 18-20, and are not guaranteed, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 9-13. However, 
none of the commissions that Bret is paid ( even on a monthly basis) are guaranteed, being contingent 
upon underwriting accepting a policy, contingent on the insured paying the premium, or the insured 
not cancelling the policy and going with another company, Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, LL. 14-25, p. 95, LL. 
1-2. All three companies pay contingent commissions or profit sharing payments annually and not 
monthly, Tr. Vol. II, p. 272, LL. 2-4. All three companies issue the checks payable to Nield, Inc. and 
not to Bret Kunz, Tr. Vol. I, p. 216, LL. 19-25. From this, somehow, the Court concluded that Kunz 
is entitled to 50 percent of the Gem State profit sharing and not one dime of the other companies.29 
It is simply intellectually dishonest and flies in the face of the factual findings of the Court itself and 
of the parties' course of dealing and performance with each other. 
True, Nield, Inc. was cheating Bret Kunz on contingent commission or profit sharing 
payments where Bret did not have access to the accounting information, and attempting to delude 
29Bryan Nield testified that N.I. doesn't pay any profit sharing or contingent commissions, 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 20 I, LL. 7-9, but that they "get together and take any profits we've earned. And if 
we decide to give out bonuses then we decide what - we take and pay money to the company, see 
what is left, and determine what amount to pay for a bonus to whoever we feel is necessary." Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 202, LL. 10-15. Under that formula, Bryan Nield denied that the unusual number of 
$663.50 was designed to make Bret think he got his fair share of a profit sharing check from 
Acuity. Tr. Vol. I, p. 202, LL. 16-21. 
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him into believing he had received 50 percent his pro rata share 
, · t 30 the comm1ss1on paymen . 
construing a contract in favor of the drafter. If anything, as 
a matter public policy and jurisprudence, it discouraged, not encouraged in people's 
contractual relations. The net result in this case is to reward the deceiver. Moreover, inasmuch as the 
deception was never disclosed to Bret Kunz prior to this litigation, it cannot stand as a basis of the 
parties' intent. Bues, supra. 
The District Court erred in not recognizing the parties' course of dealing defined the parties' 
intent with respect to the term "commissions", in the Agent Contract, rather than some implied in 
fact agreement. The Court was troubled by the lack of evidence that Michael Kunz was paid profit 
sharing payments; however, while Bryan Nield initially denied paying any profit sharing payments 
to Michael Kunz, he later acknowledged Michael was paid from Gem State. Tr. Vol. II, p. 284, LL. 
20-25, p. 285, LL. 1-4. He further acknowledged that he didn't know how Michael was paid 
concerning the "other functions" portion of the contract. Tr. Vol. II, p.283, LL. 24-25, p. 284, LL. 
1-19. Bryan acknowledged that information would be within the purview of his father. Id. The 
subject contract, however, was drafted solely by Bryan Nield and entered into by Bryan, Marti and 
Bret. The Court placed undue emphasis on the absence of proof of what transpired between the 
deceased Michael Kunz and Nield, Inc., attributing this to a lack of due diligence on Bret Kunz' part. 
R. 525, footnote 29. The Appellants are unsure what speculation the Court places here. Michael 
Kunz was obviously an unavailable witness, and the records of profit sharing payments to him were 
30Bret Kunz testified that when he received the Acuity profit sharing check of $663.50 he 
believed he was receiving his fair share of the profit sharing payment for that year. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
48, LL. 4-23. In reality, after subpoenaing the records in this case from the insurance company, 
that number did not correlate to either 50/50 or 80/20, and "there's no mathematical sense to that 
based on anything in the contract." Tr. Vol. I, p. 48, LL. 7-10. 
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exclusively within the domain of the adverse party, whom we've already established was less than 
forthright with Bret Kunz. The question before the Court is the intent of these parties, and the words 
used by Bryan Nield labeling payments to Bret Kunz as profit sharing for Gem State, as profit 
sharing for Acuity, as profit sharing for Farmers Alliance, and in stating in his own written 
memoranda to Bret that the payments were for profit sharing, speaks louder than the quietness of the 
deceased Michaei Kunz as to these parties' intent. 
Finally, the Court's ruling that Brett Kunz should be paid profit sharing on Gem State as a 
side agreement, flies in the face of the parties 's discussions during said course of dealing, particularly 
Ex. 109 wherein Bryan Nield wrote "The reason we have paid profit sharing 50/50 is based on 
ownership, not commissions, and therefore there are no guarantees on profit sharing." Ex. 109. The 
only basis for Bret having any ownership interest at all [ in the book of business] is the 2009 contract, 
as he had no ownership interest under the 1996 contract (and the purchase of the Michael Kunz's 
book of business from Judy Kunz, Ex. 128). Profit sharing is, at a minimum, a derivative of his 
Agent Agreement, and not some side agreement.31 Bret owns no more, and not less, of the book of 
business with Gem State as he does with Acuity and Alliance-exactly 50% of the Montpelier book. 
This Court should reverse the District Court on the issue of the meaning of "commissions" as 
between Bret and Marti Kunz and Nield, Inc. under the 2009 contract.32 
. 31As previously noted in footnote 26, Bret received the first profit sharing check in 2009, 
Just after execution of the subject Agent Contract. 
32Again, it was Bret Kunz' understanding that under his 1996 contract, in which he was 
not owner of the book of business, profit sharing payments were being paid to Michael. He 
simply wasn't expecting, as a sub-producer under Michael, to receive them personally. Tr. Vol I, 
p. 27, LL. 10-22, p. 28, LL 1-22. 
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III. THE COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE "OTHER FUNCTIONS" LANGUAGE 
OF THE SUBJECT AGENT CONTRACT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR 
PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS. 
Although not Bret Kunz' primary position, he maintained alternatively below that the 
language "other function based on commission split" of section 6 of the Agent Contract would also 
cover his claim for profit sharing or contingent commissions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 100, LL. 6-11. The 
District Court concluded that the "other functions" language was ambiguous, R. 517, 1 19, but never 
addressed what that language does mean. In fact, in light of the Court's conclusions in this case, that 
language becomes meaningless surplusage. 
In construing a contract an interpretation should be avoided that would render meaningless 
any particular provision in the contract. Star Phoenix Mining Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 130 Idaho 
223,233,939 P.2d 542,552 (1997) (citing to Top of the Track Assoc. v. Lewiston Raceways, Inc., 
654A.2d 1293, 1296(Me. 1995); WyomingGame&Fish Comm 'n v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 
1985). If the "other functions" language does not embrace profit sharing and contingent 
commissions, what on earth does it embrace? The language uses the words "based on commission 
split", therefore, the "other functions" must have something to do with commissions that could be 
split. If you rule that the language of ,r 7 of the Agent Agreement must be construed narrowly when 
referencing commissions, which Appellant doesn't agree with, you must necessarily, as a matter of 
contract construction, rule that the "other functions" language embraces all other types of 
commissions. Anything less is to simply scratch out that language from the contract and create a 
better agreement for Nield, Inc. than that which it drafted for itself. By use of the words "based on 
commission split" the other functions must relate to some type of commission. These parties have 
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"initial commissions" and "residual commissions" which the Court recognizes as covered by the 
"commission" language 1 7. If the 
commissions, commonly referred to as profit light 
of1 the "other functions" language is rendered meaningless. 
not cover contingent 
Court's narrow construction 
In Steal Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259,297 P.3d 222 (2012), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
We hold the Lease and Option is ambiguous and the district court therefore 
erred by excluding parol evidence of intent. The plain language of a contract, if 
unambiguous, is controlling. Cont 'l Nat 'l Am. Group v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 95 
Idaho 251, 253, 506 P.2d 478,480 (1973). A court must look to the contract as a 
whole and give effect to every part thereof. Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 
125, 117 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1941). "For a contract term to be ambiguous, there must 
be at least two difference reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be 
nonsensical." Swanson v. Beco Const. 145 Idaho 59, 62, 175 P.3d 748, 751 
(2007)(citingArmstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 143 Idaho 135, 138, 139 P.3d 
737, 740 (2006) and Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 446-47, 65 
P.3d 184, 187-88 (2003)). "Parol evidence may be considered to aid a trial court in 
determining the intent of the drafter of a document if any ambiguity exists." In re 
Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794, 801 (1995) (citing Hall v. Hall, 
116 Idaho 483,484, 777 P.2d 255, 256 (1989)). 
According to the plain language of the Lease and Option, Steel Farms' lease 
term began April 22, 2004 and ended March 1, 2008. In order to exercise Option A, 
Steel Farms was required to "give written notice thereof to [Croft & Reed] 
subsequent to the maturity of this option on July 15, 2008 and during the Term of this 
lease (including any agreed extension or exercised option term but excluding any 
holdover term)." We note first that the district court's interpretation fails to give 
effect to every part of this provision. because it renders superfluous the words 
"during the term of this lease (including ... )". Contrary to the district court's 
conclusion, the agreement's plain language suggest the parties did not intend to limit 
exercise of Option A to the period of an agreed lease extension, but rather to grant 
Steel Farms the ability to exercise the option during the initial lease term. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Court in this case specifically found that the "other functions" sentence in 11 6 of the 
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Agent Contract is ambiguous. R. 514, ,i 12, fn 21. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, based on the 
construction, this language has been rendered meaningless. This language is especially 
to this contract interpretation case because, own terms, it is linked to the commission 
split-the very heart of the subject dispute. The trial Court failed to provide any explanation as to why 
the "other functions" language would not encompass contingent commissions in favor of an implied 
in fact side agreement. Appellants maintain this is legal error. Where the parties have made a 
provision that on its face seems to apply, and is consistent with their course of conduct, why would 
one ever go outside of the parties own agreement to find an implied agreement whose terms are 
nebulous and speculative at best, and in this case purely hypothetical. Of course, the reason is 
because if the Court recognizes the parties' own words being consistent with their course of dealing, 
then Nield, Inc. is obviously bound by the "based on commission split" language therein. It appears 
to this counsel that rather than let the facts lead the conclusions, the trial Court made conclusions 
which do not flow from either the facts found or the contract language. 
By reading the Agent Agreement, iJ 6, consistent with, or supplemental to, ,r 7, we arrive at 
a construction which gives meaning to ,r 6 and protects both parties. Where possible a construction 
will be placed upon ambiguous or apparently inconsistent provisions of a contract as will give 
protection to both parties, as against a construction which would only be in the interest of one of the 
parties to the contract. Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P.3d 751, 755 (Idaho App. 2000); 
Allen v. Ruby Co., 87 Idaho l, 11,389 P.2d 581k, 587 (1964). 
For the forgoing reasons, this Court should conclude that the "other functions" language is 
applicable and direct the trial Court to make enter judgment in favor of Bret Kunz under ,r 6 of the 
Agent Contract on the declaratory judgment issue. 
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IV. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROFIT SHARING PAYMENTS 
SHOULD BE PREDICATED ON OWNERSHIP PERCENTAGE RATHER THAN 
THE COMMISSION SPLIT SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT. 
As already noted, the Court's interpretation and conclusions of the contract are tainted by 
consideration of the wholly subjective and undisclosed intent of Bryan Nield regarding profit sharing 
payments being bonuses. Even if this Court were to uphold the supposed "side agreement", such that 
Nield, Inc. is not constrained by its own contract, one cannot find that there was a meeting of the 
minds regarding the commission split. It is clear from the evidence that Bret Kunz did not agree that 
profit sharing should be split 50/50. The parties exchanged objections and memorandums arguing 
the point, Ex. I 06, 108, 109, and 110. In fact, the last payment for Gem State paid by Nield, Inc. was 
actually calculated under the 80/20 formula. Ex. I 09. In this case, the parties have addressed how 
commissions are to be handled. Where contractual provisions conflict, "the interpretation of the 
written contract and the intent of the parties is a matter for the trial judge's discretion." Haener v. 
Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170,173,697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985). Moreover, "[i]t is well 
established that specific provisions in a contract control over general provisions where both relate 
to the same thing." Twin Lakes Viii. Prop Ass 'n,lnc. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 138,857 P.2d 611, 
617 ( 1993 ), cited in City of Meridian v. Petra, supra at 246. 
Here, we have a written contract which clearly defines the commission split. That provision 
is not ambiguous and the Court did not find it was. Even if one were to find an ambiguity between 
the commission split provision in ,r 7 and the ownership of the first paragraph 8 of the Agent 
Contract, one would still have to construe the contract in favor of the specific ,r 7 and against the 
ownership provision in ,r 8, because nothing in ,r 8 specifically addresses commission split. The 
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Court in this case went completely outside of the written contract and construed and implied in fact 
contract, but then imported 1 8's ownership provisions as the predicate for splitting the commission 
An implied in fact contract might be found under circumstances where the parties have made 
no contract for themselves but in fact have had a course of dealing that seems to recognize same. 
Here, however, the parties had a written contract and the course of dealing was admitted to assist the 
finder of fact in interpreting their intent under the words used, not to throw the contract in the 
garbage and write a new contract for the parties better than what Nield, Inc. ever bargained for, and 
entirely incongruous with the parties' course of dealings and the words expressed by Nield, Inc. 
agents. This Supreme Court should set aside the conclusion that profit sharing payments are limited 
to 50/50 where nothing in the written contract supports that and where the commission split is itself 
unambiguous. Moreover, the "other functions" language of16 references the commission split, not 
the ownership split. No one who signed the Agent Contract at issue in this case could possibly guess 
at the signing thereof that any commission split between the parties would be other than 80/20. The 
Trial Court erred in so concluding. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE AGENT CONTRACT 
AGAINST THE DRAFTER, NIELD, INC. 
Throughout the case the Plaintiff argued, and the Trial Court ignored the principle that 
ambiguous terms are to be construed against the drafter. R. 437 (Plaintiff's Trial Brief), 436 
(Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). Although not addressed by the 
Court in its findings, the record is absolutely clear and undisputed that the subject contract entered 
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by and between the parties was prepared and drafted by Bryan Nield, and he alone33• Tr. Vol. 
1 - wherein Bryan Nield stated: 
Q. Okay. So did you prepare exhibit 105? 
A. I'm sure I had a hand in it, yes. 
Q. Didn't you state in your deposition that you did prepare it? 
A. That's what I just said. 
Q. You said here today that you just had a hand in it. Did you prepare it or not? 
A. Yes. 
The Court in this case acknowledged that the contract term "commissions" was ambiguous, 
R. 516, 11 18, 19, ( and even recognized this fact at trial). 34 If it is necessary to examine extrinsic 
evidence ... [i]n making the examination one must be mindful that "a contract should be construed 
most strongly against the party preparing it or employing the words concerning which doubt arises." 
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 9,415 P.2d 48, 51 (1966), cited by the dissent in 
Simplotv. Bosen, supra at 757. See also, Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Luna, 241 P.3d 945, 149 Idaho 
772 (2010) (ambiguous grant deed construed against the drafter, citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 
Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001)); Madrid v. Roth, IO P.3d 751, 134 Idaho 802 (Idaho App. 
2000); Schilling v. Allstate Ins. Co., 980 P.2d 1014, 132 Idaho 927 (1999); Suchan v. Suchan, 741 
P.2d 1289, 113 Idaho 102 (1986) (the general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be 
construed against the drafter, supra at 1295); Win of Michigan, Inc. v Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 
33The District Court never even addressed the issue of who drafted the contract, but the 
record is undisputed on this point. Appellants maintain the lower court erred in not considering 
this legal doctrine under the circumstances of this case. 
34This was also supported by Defendant's expert witness, Stephen Ahl, who 
acknowledged that the term "commission" may or may not include profit sharing payments 
within the insurance industry contract. Tr. Vol. II, p. 358, LL. 24, 25, p. 359, LL. 1-15. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - Page 35 
1, 53 P.3d 330, 334 (2002) (construe the contract most strongly against the person who 
prepared the contract). 150 Idaho 308, 325, 
961, 
Other states concur. In Town of Marana v. Pima County, 230 Ariz. 142, 281 P .3d 1010, 1015 
(Ariz. App. Div. 1 2012) the Court noted that "[w]hen the meaning of a contractual provision 
remains unclear after consideration of the parties' intentions, 'a secondary rule of construction 
requires the provision be construed against the drafter."' citing to MT Builders, L.L. C., v Fisher 
Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, 302, ,r10, 197 P.3d 758, 763 (App. 2008); 35Board of County 
Commissioners of Butler County, v. Little, 305 P. 3d 49, (Kan. App. 2013)( an ambiguity in the 
contract is construed against the drafter);, See also, Hayden Outdoors, LLC v. Zweygardt, 288 P.3d. 
159 (Kan App. 2012); Botkin v. Security Bank, 281 Kan. 243, Syl. ~!7, 130 P.3d 92 
(2006)("Ambiguous language in a written instrument will be strictly construed against the drafter 
of the document"); Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Harwood, 162 Wn. App. 385, 254 P.3d 208 
(Wash. App. Div. 3 2011) (ambiguities are construed against the drafter of the contract);Rouse v. 
Glascum Builders, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 127, 135,677 P.2d 125 (1984). 
Sound judicial policy favors the construction of ambiguities in a contract against the drafter. 
If you construe ambiguous contracts in favor of the drafter, particularly in a situation where the 
drafter puts out more than one contract, then you have an endless series of litigants in the court due 
to the misunderstanding ( or in this case intention misleading) of the other parties to those contracts. 
35 Kunz recognizes the Court did not reach that far in its analysis, but maintains that is 
because it [improperly] considered the immaterial evidence of Bryan Nield's undisclosed and 
subjective intent regarding bonuses, and did not consider the parties course of dealing as 
interpretive of the ambiguous term "commission", which it should have. 
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For example, in this case, Nield, Inc. has more than one sub-producer, the others being in the 
, ,,._,<U'-'l"' office. If they, are confused as their rights to contingent commissions or profit 
payments, each of them as because were not parties to this suit 
and did not get their day in court. If you construe against the drafter, you put an end to the litigation, 
once and for all, because the drafter had his day in court and lost. It also encourages parties, 
particuiariy commercial parties, to seek counsel in drafting sophisticated contract relationships to 
avoid just the kind a malady that has occurred here. 
By construing the contract narrowly in favor of the drafter, as in this case, the District Court 
has encouraged both amateur contract drafting, and ambiguities designed to mislead or create 
confusion, a policy which opens the floodgates for endless litigation and which serves no one's 
needs ( other than perhaps the legal community). Moreover, these parties are engaged in the insurance 
business and necessarily know that the law construes ambiguous contracts against insurance 
companies. It is reasonable they should expect the same treatment here. 
The Court attempts to justify its deviation from the standard principle by arguing that Bret 
Kunz did not get profit sharing payments when he was a sub-producer under Mike Kunz. However, 
the Court ignored Bret Kunz' reasoning that "he [Michael Kunz] was giving me the full 80 percent 
of the commission that was being paid on what I sold. He provided the office, the computers, took 
care of all the office expenses, so he wasn't making a dime on me. Basically, it was agreed that he 
took any profit sharing or contingent commissions." Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, LL. 14-19. Bret went on to 
explain that, from his knowledge, Michael Kunz was receiving profit sharing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 27, LL. 
20-23, p. 28, LL. 2-18. Even if Bret Kunz were not receiving profit sharing as a sub-producer under 
Michael Kunz, that does not mean he didn't believe he was not entitled to profit sharing once he 
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became a co-owner of the Montpelier book of business. In fact. the District Court's rationale in this 
case for awarding Bret profit sharing payments at 50 percent for Gem State is predicated on his co-
ownership of the Montpelier book of business, which flies in the face of the Court's own reasoning 
that Gem state is a separate deal between the parties. 36The proper rule of construction, especially 
where the Court admitted that, "The problem with both parties' positions is that the evidence, in the 
trial record, demonstrates that there was much (sic] not much, if any', discussion regarding this 
contract or its individual provisions."37 R. 517, ,i 22. The Court's position in its Conclusions of Law 
are inherently incongruent and inconstant with its own findings. If there is little or no discussion 
about profit sharing, the contract should be construed against the drafter because Bryan Nield drafted 
an ambiguous contract. If there was discussion about profit sharing at the time of the signing of the 
contract, then the contract should be construed in favor of profit sharing to Bret Kunz because that 
was the parties' express intent at the time of signing. Either there was, or there was not, discussion 
about profit sharing at the time of signing the contract. A fortiori, profit sharing or contingent 
commissions are a part of the subject agency contract, and the Court erred in not so ruling. 
VI. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT FORM BY NOT ACKNOWLEDGING 
THE APPELLANTS PREVAILED IN PART IN THE DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT. 
36 This also renders the language "other functions based upon commission split and 
individual agreement" set forth in ,r 6 of the Agent Contract a nullity. 
37This conclusion [,r 22] flies in the face of conclusion ,i 26, R. 519, wherein the Court 
found that there were discussions about profit sharing at the time of the signing of the contracts, 
Ex. 104, 105, and the Court specifically noted that Nield, Inc. never disputed, corrected or 
suggested that profit sharing was not a part of their relationship prior to this litigation. R. 519, 
footnote 24. · 
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On November 20, 2014, just three week prior to trial, the Defendant, Nield, Inc., had a 
hearing on its motion to amend its Complaint, at which it withdrew the Motion to Amend, stipulated 
to dismiss its Counterclaim against Bret prejudice, dismissed the cross-claim against 
Marti Kunz with prejudice, and stipulated to the relief requested in Plaintiffs' third portion of the 
declaratory judgment count of the Complaint. Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 35, LL. 4-22; R. 323-325.38 
The Order to Dismiss the Counterclaim was entered November 20, 2014, R. 317-318, but no order 
was ever entered with respect to dismissal of the cross-claim against Marti Kunz. Nor did the Court 
in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 497-529, its Declaratory Judgment dated 
September 18, 2015, R. 565-567, its Declaratory Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate dated 
November 5, 2015, R. 687-690, or the Judgement and Rule 54(b) Certificate dated December 22, 
2015, ever acknowledge that the Plaintiff prevailed on the third ground of its declaratory judgment 
count. 
The Court read into the record that portion of the third count, "the Defendant has no interest 
in life and health insurance sold by Plaintiff or his wife, and no interest in the health insurance book 
of business bought from Mike Kunz' s widow and enhanced or prospered thereafter by Marti Kunz." 
Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 16, LL. 16-20. Ultimately, Nield, Inc.'s stipulation to this fact has never 
found its way into any judgment or declaratory judgment entered by the Court. This counsel 
recognizes that the declaratory judgment appealed from is interlocutory in nature, and only certified 
as final under Rule 54. Nevertheless, counsel would be amiss not to object on appeal to the form of 
38The actual Minute Entry & Order states that the Plaintiff agreed not to pursue the third 
portion of the declaratory relief action, but the actual language of the hearing is different. Therein 
counsel for the Kunz's specifically stated that he was not withdrawing it, [third count] but that 
they [Nield, Inc.] were stipulating to it. Tr. 11-20-14 hearing, p. 35, LL. 11-22. 
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the Order to protect his clients' interests. The fact that Plaintiffs prevailed in this regard (the life and 
health business) is an important issue, may have an impact on attorney's fees below, and needs to 
a part of the declaratory judgment itself, less stipulation given the Defendant be discarded 
and of no import or effect. The Court should order that any final judgment incorporate into the 
judgment language effectuating the stipulation of November 20, 2014. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the conclusions of the District Court regarding the declaratory 
judgment action should be reversed, and the trial Court directed to enter judgment in favor of the 
Appellants and against Nield, Inc. that the contract, specifically the use of the word "commission", 
does include contingent commissions or profit sharing payments. Even if it did not, the "other 
functions" language controls because any other interpretation would render this clause of the contract 
meaningless. Bryan Nield' s subjective and undisclosed intent that what he labeled as "profit sharing" 
was intended to be nothing more than gratuitous bonuses is wholly inadmissible and should not have 
been considered by the trial Court in interpreting the contract. The contract was prepared by Nield, 
Inc. entirely and should be construed against them. The judgment ultimately entered in this case 
should further reflect the stipulation by Nield, Inc. that it has no right or interest in the Appellants' 
life and health business. Finally, the Court should be directed to proceed with trial on the issue of 
damages. Appellants should be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal. 
DA TED THIS 5' day of July, 2016. 
~~~~ EVEN A. W THRICH 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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